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The compatibility of an "animal lib­
eration" ethic and an environmental 
eth ic depends prima ri lyon how one 
interprets the meaning and moral 
structu re of a theory of envi ronmental 
ethics. In part this is because the 
meaning and moral structure of an 
animal liberation ethic is fairly 
straightforward: it focuses on the 
absence of morally relevant differences 
between humans and animals, and on 
the moral significance of animal pain 
and suffering. 1 But the form of an 
environmental ethic is not so clear. 
Does an environmental ethic advocate 
moral concern for natural individuals, 
for species I for ecosystems, or per­
haps for nature as a whole? An ans­
wer to this question is required 
before one can judge the relationship 
between animal liberation and environ­
mental ethics, but an answer', unfor­
tunately, is not easily discernible. In 
what follows I will argue, first, that 
several versions of an envi ronmental 
ethic yield problematic environmental 
and moral conclusions; second, that 
an environmental ethic must be inter­
preted as a complex balancing of dif­
ferent kinds of moral concern-i.e., 
moral concern for individuals, for 
species, and . for natu ral ecosys­
tems-and th i rd, that this balanci ng 
will pr"oduce moral results that are 
troubling to the advocate of an animal 
I ibet"ation eth ic. 
An analysis of the form of an envi­
ronmental ethic can proceed most eas­
ily if the potential objects for moral 
concern are divided into three major 
groups: individuals, species, and eco­
systemic commu n ities. Th us one 
interpretation of an environmental 
ethic will hold that moral obligations, 
duties, or rules are applicable to all 
natural individuals-animals, plants, 
bodies of water, soil, rocks, minerals, 
etc. Another interpretation of an 
environmental ethic will consider natu­
ral species as the proper object of 
moral concern. A final interpretation 
of an environmental ethic will hold 
that moral concepts are appl icable to 
ecosystems or natural communities as a 
whole. Restricting the discussion to 
these possibilities will greatly facilitate 
the analysis, and the cost in terms of 
conceptual clarity will not be signifi­
cant. The form of an environmental 
ethic that considers obligations to 
natu re as a whole, for example, can 
easily be assimilated into the ecosys­
temic interpretation, once one consid­
ers the earth's biosphere as one large 
and complex ecosystemic commu n ity. 
In analyzing the meaning and form 
of an environmental ethic, two central 
points need to be considered. Fi rst, 
is the formal structu re of the eth ic 
coherent, reasonable, and in general 
agreement with normal ethical prac­
tice? Of course an environmental 
ethic is different from traditional ethi­
cal theories that consider only human 
actions, concerns, and institutions the 
primary objects of moral value-but 
nonetheless, an envi ronmental eth ic 
cannot be so radically different hom 
tr'ad itional eth ical theories that it 
defies cl'edibility. It must be a plau­
sible revision in the meaning and jus­
tification of moral concepts. Second, 
the interpretation of an envi ronmental 
ethic must be in accord with the gen­
eral policies of environmentalism, i.e., 
of envi ronmental protection. Although 
it might seem strange to cite this as a 
significant consideration in the 
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analysis of an environmental 
ethic-isn't it obvious that an environ­
mental ethic is in accord with a policy 
of environmentalism?-the fact is that 
certain interpretations of the meaning 
of an envi ronmental eth ic actually 
undermine environmentalist principles. 
These interpretations of an environ­
mental ethic will thus be rejected on 
the practical ground that they fail to 
achieve the goal of envi ,"onmental pro­
tection. 
II 
Perhaps the most obvious interpre­
tation of an environmental ethic is the 
moral consideration of the ecosystem, 
or the natural community as a whole. 
Aldo Leopold's oft-quoted definition of 
the moral rightness of human environ­
mental action is generally used as a 
thematic signpost for this position: "A 
thing is right when it tends to pre­
serve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise. "2 In 
the more recent literature, J. Baird 
Callicott and Don Marietta, Jr., have 
each argued for this model of an 
environmental ethic. Callicott de­
scribes Leopold's vision in this way: 
"the good of the biotic community is 
the ultimate measure of the moral 
value, the rightness or wrongness, of 
actions. " Or in other words: "the 
effect upon ecological systems is the 
decisive factor in the determination of 
the ethical quality of actions." 3 Simi­
larly, Marietta writes that "morally 
acceptable treatment of the environ­
ment is that which does not upset the 
integrity of the ecosystem as it is 
seen in a diversity of life forms exist­
ing in a dynamic and complex but sta­
ble interdependency. "4 Thus, in this 
version of an environmental ethic, the 
natural ecosystem or community is the 
prima ry object of moral concern. The 
morality of human deliberative action 
will be judged by various criteria of 
ecosystemic goodness-the stability, 
integrity, health, and diversity of the 
natur"al biotic community. Actions 
which affect an ecosystem as a whole­
e.g., the damming of a river, the 
clearing of forest land, the draining 
of a marsh-will be morally judged by 
thei I' relation to ecological concepts 
concerning the entire natural commu­
nity under consideration. Even 
actions di rected towa rds individual 
natural entities will be judged by eco­
systemic criteria: shooting a deer or 
chopping down a single tree will be 
morally evaluated by the effect the 
action has on the natural community. 
A number of comments can be made 
about this interpretation of an envi­
ronmental ethic. First, it is clear 
that this model of moral concern in an 
environmental ethic is incompatible, as 
such, with an ethic of animal libera­
tion. An ethic which evaluates action 
in terms of communal health and sta­
bility cannot be seriously interested in 
the welfare of individual entities-such 
as animals-unless these individuals are 
particularly important to communal 
functions. As Bryan Norton has 
recently argued, "the relationship be­
tween the individual interests of 
organisms, individual plants, and 
nonliving objects, on the one hand, 
and the healthy functioning and 
integrity of the ecosystem, on the 
other hand, is a contingent one. "5 
The overall healthy functioning of the 
natural community may require the 
death, destruction, or suffering of 
individual natural entities, animals 
included. From the perspective of the 
natu ral commu n ity, the sacrifice of 
individual entities may be the morally 
correct course of action. Callicott 
thus argues that a major thesis of an 
animal liberation ethic-the moral sig­
nificance of the suffering of animals-is 
irrelevant in the moral evaluations of 
an ecosystemic envi ronmental eth ic. 
"Pain and pleasure seem to have noth­
ing at all to do with good and evil if 
our appraisal is taken from the 
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vantage point of ecological biology . . 
If natu re as a whole is good, then 
pain and death are also good. "6 Or 
rather, if the well-being of the natu­
ral community or ecosystem is the pri­
mary good of moral judgment, then 
pain and death that contributes to 
this overall good cannot be judged as 
a moral evil, as an animal liberation 
ethic would require. Because an ani­
mal liberation ethic is concerned with 
the welfare of individual animals, 
while a community-based environmental 
ethic may requi re the sacrifice of 
individual animals, the two ethical 
systems cannot be compatible. 
The second point to notice about 
the interpretation of an environmental 
ethic that focuses on the natural com­
munity is that it may also require the 
suffering or death of human individu­
als. The attempt to determine the 
moral worth of animals in a system of 
environmental ethics includes the 
determi nation of the moral worth of 
human bei ngs. Callicott, agai n, notes 
that in an environmental ethic "the 
moral worth of individuals (including, 
n. b., human individuals) is relative, 
to be assessed in accordance with the 
particular relation of each to the col­
lective entity," i.e., the natural com­
munity.7 Thus, humans are not to be 
given their traditionally special moral 
status based on rationality, moral 
autonomy, or whatever. Instead, 
human individuals, just as all other 
natural entities, will be morally evalu­
ated by thei I' contribution to the wel­
fare, the healthy functioning, of the 
natural community. This revision of 
the traditional lofty moral status of 
human individuals is a source of seri­
ous criticism of an environmental 
ethic. Why, it might be argued, 
should humans accept a system of 
moral rules that may require harmful 
consequences to human individuals or 
human projects and institutions? One 
need only consider the existence of 
species-osuch as the smallpox virus or 
disease-bea ri ng mosqu itoes- wh ich 
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threaten human individuals. Must the 
species still be protected at the cost 
of human life? It does no good to 
respond to this criticism by arguing 
that in the long run restricting human 
activity or sacrifici ng human individu­
as for the protection of the natural 
community will benefit human society. 
Although this is a popular argument 
of many environmentalists, it is only a 
contingent possibi lity.1 ndeed, a dif­
ferent point seems more probable: 
since the primary goal of moral action 
is the good of the natural community, 
and since human technology and pop­
u lation growth create many of the 
th reats to envi ronmental health, an 
envi ronmental ethic may demand the 
elimination of much of the human race 
and human civilization. This consid­
eration casts serious doubts on the 
plausibility of the environmental ethic 
based on the welfare of the natu ral 
community as a whole. 
The only possible method of 
defending an environmental ethic from 
this criticism is to insist that human 
life and institutions are part of the 
natural community whose good is the 
primary end of all action. Human 
flourishing is important because it is 
an essential component of the natural 
commu n ity. An erwi ronmental eth ic 
that excluded humans from the natural 
community would clearly threaten the 
continuation of all human projects and 
activities-whatever' humans did would 
have an adverse effect on the moral 
unit, the natural community. An 
environmental ethic that excluded 
humans from the natural community, 
for example, would prohibit humans 
from filling in a small marsh area in 
order to expand a pre-existing hous­
ing development on its border. But 
an environmental ethic that considers 
human well-being as part of the natu­
ral community (not, of course, the 
supreme part), as part of the moral 
end of action, might permit the 
expansion of the housing development 
after a cornpar'ison of the benefits and 
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harms to the human population and 
the natural environment (the marsh). 
At best, however, including 
humans in the natural community is 
only a partial deflection of the criti­
cism of an environmental ethic based 
on its anti-human tendencies. An 
environmental ethic with an appropri­
ate perspective on the place of 
humanity in the natural system will 
save a few human projects and activi­
ties, but it will still require major 
changes in human activity, major 
human sacrifices for the sake of the 
overall community. Unfortunately, 
specifyi ng these changes and sacri­
fices by means of concrete examples is 
a difficult-and perhaps impossi­
ble-task. The making of environmen­
tal decisions is not a job for the arm­
chair philosopher: a proper en­
vironmental decision requires a 
multitude of scientific and sociological 
data as a factual basis. Nevertheless, 
even if humans are included in the 
natural community so that their inter­
ests are taken into account in the 
determination of communal well-being, 
it should be clear that dumping toxic 
pollutants into a lake-a lake that is 
not used in any other way by 
humans-would be a moral evil, an 
injury to the natural environment. 
Whether humans would be permitted to 
dam a river for electrical power is a 
more problematic case, since the harm 
to the natu ral envi ronment as a whole 
is less severe; in this kind of case 
specific facts would be needed to make 
the moral determination. The crucial 
point to remember is that this form of 
an environmental ethic claims that 
humans are no different than any 
other species; the measure of their 
worth and the worth of thei r activities 
is decided by the overall well-being of 
the natural community. If I plan to 
dig a well on my property in the 
country I will have to consider· the 
effect of my drawing water not only 
on my human neighbors and their 
water supplies, but also on the 
surrounding countryside and its non­
human inhabitants. An envi ronmental 
ethic thus requires a major revision in 
traditional human moral practice. In 
an environmental ethic moral decisions 
transcend inter-human relationships to 
consider the natural community as a 
whole. Moral decisions cannot be 
made by simply considering conse­
quences to human life. But this revi­
sion in moral practice is not easily 
granted; humans must relinquish their 
special place in the moral universe. 
Thus an environmental ethic may not 
be acceptable to humans because it 
implausibly revises traditional moral 
practice. 
A final comment concerning this 
inter'pretation of an envi ronmental 
ethic undermines its validity even 
more. The fact is that an environ­
mental ethic that considers the overall 
well-·being of community as the' the 
primary goal of all action cannot 
explain the moral rightness of all the 
policies desired by the contemporary 
environmentalist movement. . This ver­
sion of an environmental ethic is una­
ble to explai n the protection of ra re 
and endangered species, species so 
threatened that they play little or no 
part· in the ecology of their natural 
communities. In this regard, Lilly­
Marlene Russow cites as an example 
the David deer, a species now pre­
served on ly in zoos, a species whose 
origi nal habitat or natu ral ecosystem 
is unknown to humanity. 8 Similarly, 
the snail darter or the bald eagle are 
examples of species which have little 
or no ecological function in their nat­
ural habitats. In a sense, then, 
these species a re not members of the 
natural community, not functioning 
parts of the ecological system. Their 
preservation, therefore, cannot be 
guaranteed by simply securing the 
morad goal of communal or ecosystemic 
well-being. An envi ronmental ethic 
designed to treat communal welfare as 
the primary good cannot explain the 
preservation of species so rare that 
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they no longer serve an ecological 
function. But since the preservation 
of ra re species is an important goal of 
environmentalists, this interpretation 
of an environmental ethic must be 
rejected. 
The problem of the role of endan­
gered species in ecological communities 
leads to a ~econd possible interpreta­
tion of an environmental ethic: per­
haps an envi ronmental eth ic is an eth­
ica system that considers species as 
the primary object of moral concern. 
An advocate of this version' of an 
environmental ethic could argue then 
that ra re and endangered species 
ought to be preserved because natural 
species are the primary recipients of 
moral obligation. Destroying a species 
wou Id be morally wrong, because it is 
equivalent to the traditional prohib­
ition against killing an individual 
human being. In addition, a species­
based environmental ethic could also 
explain obligations to ecological com­
munities as a whole, since these com­
munities contain species of living 
things or they are the habitats neces­
sa ryfor the survival of species. 
T his interp retation of an env ironmen­
tal ethic might therefore be more 
,attuned to the needs of the environ­
mentalist, i.e., to the protection of 
rare and endangered species and the 
preservation of natu ral ecological com­
mu n ities and habitats. 
The first point to notice about this 
"species" interpretation of an environ­
mental, ethic is that, like the commu­
nity model, it is basically incompatible 
with an animal liberation ethic. Al­
though it restricts moral concern to a 
'much smaller group of entities than 
the natural community, it still focuses 
on a collection of entities rather than 
on individuals. Since the primary 
moral goal is the well-being and sur­
vival of species, the pain or death of 
individual members of the species is of 
secondary importance. It may be ne­
cessa ry, for example, to manage or 
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"harvest" an animal specIes that IS 
over'populating an area and threaten­
ing its own food supply. The death 
(even if painless) of individual animals 
in order to insure the continuance of 
the entire species would be a moral 
evil in a system of animal liberation 
ethics. 
In addition, there are conceptual 
problems with this interpretation of an 
environmental ethic. In a practical 
sense, the moral consideration of 
species does not provide di rect rea­
sons for the protection of the nonliv­
ing environmental background, the 
natural objects that form the material 
~tructure of ecosystems. Envi ronmen­
talists, for example, seek the preser­
vation of beautiful natural rock forma­
tions, free-flowing rivers, and un­
developed wetlands. They seek this 
preservation, not simply because of 
the life forms which live in and 
a rou nd these natu ral areas, but 
because of some direct interest in the 
nonliving objects themselves. But 
this concern for nonliving natural 
objects cannot be explained by a moral 
consideration of species. 
A more serious problem is the jus­
tification of an envi ronmental ethic 
that focuses on species as the primary 
object of moral consideration. Why 
should species count so much? Why 
s hou Id species be so importa nt? Joel 
Feinberg, for one, discounts species 
enti I'ely as the proper objects of 
direct moral concern : "A whole collec­
tion, as such, cannot have beliefs, 
expectations, wants, or desires 
Individual elephants can have inter­
ests, but the species elephant can­
not. "9 For Feinberg, at least, an 
entity without interests cannot have 
moral rights or be an object of moral 
consideration, Now although I am not 
suggesting agreement with Feinberg's 
views, he does emphasize the oddity 
of considering a whole species a mor­
ally relevant entity. Indeed, this 
interpretation of an environmental 
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ethic has rather an ad hoc aur'a to it: 
since environmentalists desire the 
protection of rare and endangered 
species, they create an ethic that 
considers species in themselves as 
morally valuable. But on what can 
this moral value be based? Either a 
species is important because it fulfills 
an ecological function in the natural 
community, in which case the commu­
nity model of an environmental ethic 
will explain its preservation; or a 
species is important because the indi­
vidual members of the species are 
valuable, in which case an individual­
istic model of an environmental ethic 
will explain the act of preservation. 10 
I n itself, a species-based environmen­
tal ethic seems· to be an uneasy, 
groundless compromise between the 
broad view that the natural community 
is the environmentally appropriate 
moral object and the narrow view that 
natural individuals are themselves the 
bearers of moral worth. 11 
Thus one arrives at the third 
interpretation of an environmental 
ethic: an environmental ethic is a 
system of ethical rules and obligations 
pertaining to individual natural enti­
ties di rectly. Natu ral entities have 
moral value in themselves, and so 
they must be protected by envi ron­
mentally correct policies of action. 
Human deliberative action will be mor­
ally evaluated by its relationship to 
the individual natural entities in the 
environment. Draining a marsh or 
dammi ng a river wi II be judged by the 
effects produced on the individual 
entities in these natural areas. The 
ecosystem or natural community as a 
whole will be protected because the 
individuals who make up the commu­
nity will be protected in themselves. 
At first glance, this interpretation has 
much to recommend it. It has a 
structure similar to traditional moral 
theories that consider human i ndividu­
als the primary objects of moral con­
cern. Since natural individuals are 
being considered, there is no need to 
intr'oduce peculiar' ontological ques­
tions about the interests or desires of 
collections or commu n ities. Moreover, 
Leopold suggests an analogy with var­
ious historical extensions of moral 
consideration and rights to groups of 
human individuals: blacks, women, 
children, etc. 12 And Christopher 
Stone has argued that the legal con­
cept of guardianship can be used to 
provide this moral conception with a 
substantive content: i. e., the consid­
eration of individual natu ral entities 
as the beneficiaries (in themselves) of 
human action. 13 In sum, the third 
interpretation of an envi ronmental 
ethic considers natural entities in 
themselves, as individuals, the proper 
objects of moral concern to whom 
moral ru les and obi igations apply. As 
morally valuable entities they deserve· 
protection and preservation. 
Several comments can also be made 
about this version of an environmental 
ethic. First, it is clear that this 
environmental ethic is the most similar 
to an ethic dealing with the moral sta­
tus of animals. An animal liberation 
ethic considers the moral worth of 
animals in themselves as individuals; 
this individualistic environmental ethic 
considers the moral worth of all natu­
ral entities. An animal liberation 
ethic considers as morally relevant 
certain properties of the animals 
themselves-e. g., sentience-rather than 
merely the relationship the· animals 
have to morally "superior" autonomous 
humans. Animals have intrinsic or 
inherent value based ·on some aspect 
of thei r existence and not simply an 
instrumental value for humans. Simi­
larly, an individualistic environmental 
ethic considers natural entities as 
inherently valuable because of some 
objective property they possess in 
themselves; they a re not val uable sim­
ply because of their instrumental 
value to human society and human 
interests. 14 Thus an envi ronmental 
ethic conceived on the model of indi­
vidual rights or moral consideration 
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for natu ral objects is most simi la I' to 
an animal liberation ethic; the two 
ethical theories have identical formal 
structu res. 
But there are problems with this 
version of an environmental ethic. As 
with the species-based interpretation 
of an environmental ethic, the problem 
ofiustification proves to be insolv­
able. If one grants that an environ­
mental ethic must find some objective 
property of natural entities as the 
source of intrinsic moral value, then 
one is hard pressed to discover a 
coherent and plausible candidate. 
Clearly, the criterion most often cho­
sen by advocates of an animal libera­
tion ethic, sentience or the ability to 
feel pleasure and pain, is largely 
irrelevant to an ethic that considers 
. the moral significance of plants and 
other natu ra I entities that do not feel 
pain and pleasure. Kenneth Good­
paster has thus argued for the moral 
considerability of all living entities, 
and he makes a powerful case in that 
he does not a rgue for the moral 
equivalence of all such living be­
ings. 15 Nevertheless, a reverence for 
all life criterion cannot justify an 
environmental ethic. Even assuming 
that a non-arbitrary or unbiased scale 
of moral worth could be developed to 
show when it was morally acceptable 
to ki II other forms of life (Goodpaster, 
e.g., postpones this extremely diffi­
cult task), the ethical consideration of 
all living entities does not extend the 
moral boundaries far enough. An 
envir-onmental ethic that is true to the 
principles of environmentalism must be 
able to explain the moral consideration 
of nonliving natural entities as well as 
living ones. An envi ronmental ethic 
that considers the moral worth of all 
natu ral entities is considering rocks, 
bodies of water, and the shifting 
sands of a beach to be morally con­
siderable. This moral consideration 
cannot be based on the moral criterion 
of life, since these natural entities are 
not alive. On what, then, can the 
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moral consideration be based? 
It is at this juncture that one 
begins to question the entire plan of 
finding a morally relevant property of 
all natural objects as the basis of an 
environmental ethic. As even Good­
paster discovers, in a revision of his 
earlier views, the extension of moral 
consideration beyond humans reaches 
a "breaking point" where talk of mor­
ally relevant interests and properties 
seems highly implausible. 16 The 
brea ki ng poi nt, of cou rse, is the 
moral consideration of inanimate natu­
ral objects. Can rocks or streams be 
morally considerable? Unless one pos­
tulates an ethical doctrine of the 
sacredness of all nature, there does 
not seem to be any method of justify­
ing the moral worth of individual non­
living natural entities. But a doctrine 
of the sacredness of all nature is 
highly problematic. Does it mean, for 
example, that disease organisms or 
disease-carrying insects cannot be 
exterminated? What about domesti­
cated animals and plants? Do these 
require an additiona·1 moral principle? 
Basically, the idea that an individual 
natu ral non Iiving entity has in he rent 
moral worth is too implausible to be 
seriously considered. Although one 
may wish to develop a theory that will 
protect all animals and plants, a moral 
criterion based on all of natural exis­
tence is so broad that it excludes vir­
tually nothing. 
The problem with inanimate natural 
entities forces a retu rn to a commu­
n ity or ecosystemic approach to an 
environmental ethic. Only if nonliving 
natural entities are considered as eco­
logically significant parts of a natural 
community can they be plausibly 
judged as morally worthwhile. They 
do not possess intrinsic or inherent 
value as such, but as functioning 
parts of a morally valued natural com­
mu n ity. The analysi s has th us 
returned to its starting point, and 
with disappointing results:· all of the 
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Despite the problems encou ntered 
ill all three of the interpretations of 
an environmental ethic, it may be fea­
sible to attempt some kind of compro­
mise or combination of the various 
alternatives. Perhaps a blending of 
the differing interpretations will yield 
an environmental ethic that combines 
the strong points of each version and 
avoids the implausibilities and areas of 
contention and criticism. Therefore, I 
would like to suggest the following 
version of an envi ronmental eth ic, as 
an outline of a comprehensive and 
plausible system of ethics to insure 
the protection of the natural environ­
ment. 
A meaningful and practical envi­
ronmental ethic must be composed of 
two principles or two kinds of moral 
consideration. The primary form of 
moral consideration is the moral 
regard for the ecosystem or the natu­
ral community, as discussed above as 
the first interpretation of an environ­
mental ethic. This must be the pri­
mary principle of an environmental 
ethic because envi ronmental protection 
means more than just the protection of 
natural individuals and natur"al spec­
ies-it means the protection of complete 
ecological systems. Envi ronmental ists 
and wilderness preservationists (for 
example) are interested in protecting 
environments, i. e., ecological systems 
and natural communities. The preser­
vation of individual natu ral entities or 
natural species in isolation from their 
natural habitats and communities is at 
best a last ditch effort to prevent 
extinction; it cannot be the primary 
goal of a policy of environmentalism. 
Thus the preeminent goal of action in 
a theory of environmental ethics is the 
well-being, health, or stability of the 
ecological community. Moral I'ules, 
obligations, and duties, or the moral 
evaluation of consequences of action, 
will be developed and determined by a 
concept of the ecological good, i. e. , 
the good for the ecological community 
as a whole. 
Nonetheless, this primary goa! of 
ecosystemic well-being. must be aug­
mentE~d by a secondary goal of the 
protection of natu ral individuals. 
This secondary goal will serve to limit 
the excessive use of the primary 
principle in cases where it should not 
apply. What I have in mind are cases 
such as the rare endangered species 
that is no longer a functioning part of 
the natu ral ecosystem, or even disease 
organ isms such as the smallpox vi rus 
that are on the verge of being totally 
eradicated. If ecosystemic well-being 
were the only principle of moral 
action, then it would seem permissible 
to eliminate the disease organisms or 
to let the endangered species become 
extinct. But if an environmental ethic 
has a secondary moral principle which 
is activated, so to speak, after ques­
tions of ecosystemic well-being are 
decided, then rare and endangered 
species can be protected despite their 
irrelevance to ecosystemic health and 
stability. Thus in cases where the 
health or welfare of the natural com­
munity is not at issue, human action 
affecting the envi ronment shou Id be 
judged by its relationship to natural 
individuals and species. As long as 
they do not adversely affect the 
well-being of the natural ecological 
community, all individuals and species 
ought to be preserved and protected. 
This is the second and subsidiary 
principle of a practical environmental 
ethic. 
At the risk of repeating myself, let 
me be a bit more specific about the 
ordering of these two principles. The 
primary principle must be the moral 
consideration of natural communities as 
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a whole, for this is the only method 
of protecting envi ronmental systems 
and the inanimate and non sentient 
components of these systems. If, on 
the contrary, the moral consideration 
of natural individuals was primary, 
then a coherent and plausible expla­
nation for the protection of inanimate 
natural objects would have to be given 
to insure the basic tenets of environ­
mental policy. But it is not at all 
ciear what theory of value could show 
how inanimate natural entities-stones 
and streams-are inherently valuable. 
It seems that only as parts of an eco­
logically healthy well-functioning com­
munity (that is itself valuable) do 
these inanimate and non sentient enti­
ties become valuable. Moreover, if 
the consideration of natural individu­
als was primary, it is not obvious how 
or why one would protect ecological 
systems or communities. As long as 
the individual animals, e.g., were 
hea Ithy, there wou Id be no need to 
protect thei r natu ral habitats. One 
could create articifial habitats-parks 
and preserves-that would maintain the 
well-being of the individual animals 
but would not, of course, be consis:' 
tent with environmentalist principles 
of preservation. Thus, I have sug­
gested that the moral consideration of 
ecosystemic communities is the moral 
principle most compatible with envi­
ronmental policies; augmenting this 
principle with a secondary concern for 
natural individuals-e.g., endangered 
species of animals-will yield a complete 
environmental ethic that is plausible 
and in agreement with environmentalist 
intu ition s . 
Although this ordering of two 
kinds of moral consideration for' the 
envi ronment-i. e., consideration for 
the natural ecosystemic community and 
consideration for natural individuals 
and species-yields a fai rly precise 
practical system of moral action and 
evaluation, it is not without its hard 
cases. Perhaps the most intriguing is 
the case in which the existence of a 
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particular species (or individual) 
actually threatens the natural commu­
nity as a whole. Despite environmen­
talist beliefs about the preservation of 
species, the use of the two principles 
in this type of case requires the elim­
ination of the th reateni ng species. 
Since the primary principle of an 
envi ronmental ethic, the primary goal 
of all action relating to the environ­
ment, is the health, stability, and 
well-being of the entire natural com­
munity, the community must be pro­
tected from the threat. Of course it 
is likely that in an actual instance the 
well-being of the ecosystem could be 
preserved by transfering the species 
. to a different ecosystem where it 
wou Id not be ha rmful, or by control­
ling the size of the species popula­
tion; nevertheless, if ecosystemic 
health or stability requires the elimi­
nation of the species, the species 
must be eliminated. If an environ­
mental ethic permitted the destruction 
of natu ral envi ronments, natu ral eco­
systems and communities, it would be 
meaningless or incoherent. 
I n sum, then, an envi ronmental 
ethic should be interpreted as a com­
plex balancing of two forms of moral 
consideration regarding natural enti­
ties and systems. Moral cons idet'ation 
should first be directed toward the 
natural community or ecosystem as a 
whole, so that the overall good for 
the ecosystem is the prima ry goal of 
action. But this communal good 
should be supplemented by a consid­
eration of natural individuals and 
species, so that incases where eco­
systemic well-being is not an issue, 
the protection of endangered species 
or natural individuals can be morally 
justified. This supplementary or sec­
ondary moral consideration of individ­
ua Is wi II yield a much richer envi ron­
mental ethic than the mere con­
sideration of ecosystemic good, and it 
will help avoid the objections to the 
first community-based environmental 
eth ic discussed above. Augmented by 
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a seconda ry consideration of natu ral 
individuals, this theory will be able to 
explain the protection of rare endan­
gered species that are no longer 
functioning members of a natu ral com­
munity. It will also help to soften the 
revolutionary character of an environ­
mental ethic that considers the eco­
systemic good superior to the good· of 
human individuals; because of the 
secondary principle natural individuals 
(including humans) will not be 
excluded from direct moral considera­
tion. Thus, the balancing of these 
two kinds of moral consideration yields 
the most plausible and practical envi­
t'onmental ethic, an envi ronmental 
ethic that is essentially in accord with 
environmentalist intuitions about the 
protection of the natu ral envi ronment, 
and that is reasonable enough to be 
accepted by human moral agents. 
IV 
Finally, then, a comment on the 
relationship between this environmen­
tal ethic and an animal liberation 
ethic. It should be clear that if the 
primary ethical goal or principle of an 
environmental ethic is the well-being 
of the ecosystemic natu ral commun ity 
as a whole, then the well- bei ng of 
individual animals in the community 
will sometimes be sacrified for the 
commu nal good. 17 The problem is 
that ecosystems fu nction, develop, 
and survive by means of the life and 
death struggle of competi ng natu ral 
forces, competing living beings. 
Humans cannot act to prevent the 
suffering and death of all animal life 
and remain true to an environmental 
ethic. Indeed, there may be times 
when human action to improve the 
health of the ecosystemic community 
will require the death, destruction, or 
suffering of individual animals or ani­
mal species. Humans may have to 
eliminate disease organisms, insects, 
or even higher an imals-rabbits, deer, 
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or wolves, e.g.-which have overpopu­
lated their natural communities and 
th reaten ecosystemic stability. But an 
animal liberation ethic holds that the 
death and suffering of animals is a 
moral evil, because it violates the 
moral worth of individual. animals. 
When this death and suffering is a 
resu It of human action, even· for the 
sake of ecosystemic well-being, it is a 
direct violation of the principles of an 
animal liberation ethic. Thus, as I 
noted above, an animal liberation ethic 
and an enviromental ethic based on 
the good of the ecosystemic natu ral 
community will tend to be incompati­
ble. 
The advocate of an envi ronmental 
ethic: has, I believe, only. one method 
for removing this incompatibility: a 
revision of the basic structu re of an 
envi ronmental ethic. An envi romental 
ethic can be made compatible with an 
animal liberation ethic if it is con­
ceived as an ethic primarily concerned 
with the satisfaction of sentient 
beings-the higher animals and hu­
mans. Natural entities and ecological 
communities would be preserved, not 
because of any intrinsic value, but 
simply because they provide satisfac­
tion or pleasu re to sentient beings. 
But this model of an environmental 
ethic will not operate as a preserver 
of environmentalist policies; it makes 
an environmental ethic compatible with 
. an animal liberation ethic by destroy­
i ng the essence and the practical 
application of the environmental ethic. 
The fact is that the existence of any 
natural entity or ecological system is 
only contingently related to the satis­
factions of sentient bei ngs. An imals 
can survive and flourish in habitats 
that are not their natural homes. 
Humans, of cou rse, have developed 
such a multiplicity of artifical enjoy­
ments that there is no real need for 
the pleasures of the natural world. 18 
Now I am not arguing that humans 
receive no pleasu re from the natu ral 
environment; my point is that this 
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pleasu re is on ly conti ngently I'elated 
to the existence of the natural envi­
ronment. If the natural environment 
is only protected, e.g., because it 
provides humans with aesthetic and 
recreational satisfactions, then if 
human interests in aesthetics and rec­
reational activities change (as they 
seem to be in this increasingly artifi­
cal and technologicai world) there will 
be no reason to protect the natu ral 
environment. 19 The interests of sen­
tient beings cannot provide a secure 
basis for environmental policies, and 
thus they cannot be the primary prin­
ciple of an environmental ethic. The 
contingent relationship between the 
ex istence of the natu ral envi ronment 
and the satisfaction or interests of 
sentient beings prl:!vl:!ntsthe merger 
of an animal liberation ethic and an 
environmental ethic. Because an ani­
mal liberation ethic only requires the 
consideration of sentient life, while an 
environmental ethic requires the pres­
ervation of non sentient entities and 
systems as well as sentient life, the 
two systems are basically incompatible. 
However, a number of factors 
serve to modify this bleak picture. 
First, the environmental ethic here 
proposed is not based solely on the 
good of the ecological community as a 
whole; there is a secondary principle 
which bases moral evaluation on the 
good of individual natural entities, 
including sentient animals. As long 
as the welfare of the community is not 
at stake, individual natural enti­
ties-including animals-must be pro­
tected. Because I have a rgued for a 
balanced set of principles as the 
structure of an environmental ethic, it 
is possible to save much of an animal 
liber'ation ethic. Individual animals 
(or species of animals) cannot be 
harmed, unless there is an overriding 
and serious need on the pa rt of the 
entire natural community. 
A second factor is the problem of 
domesticated an imals. Advocates of an 
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animal liberation ethic, of course, 
seek many practical changes in human 
action affecting domesticated animals. 
Now Callicott, for one, finds this con­
cern to be almost incoherent from the 
perspective of an envi ronmental eth ic. 
Since domesticated livestock are a 
human artifact, their effects on the 
natural environment should be judged 
as any other human artifact. 20 Sheep 
g razi ng ina meadow, for example, 
may do as much ha rm to the natu ral 
cycles of the region's plant life as the 
dumping of toxic chemicals. From 
Callicott's ecological perspective, the 
fact that the sheep are animals rather 
than the instruments of human delib­
erative action would not justify or 
excuse the harm done to the natural 
environment. But I do not think that 
the advocate of an envi ronmental eth ic 
needs to worry about domesticated 
animals causing ecological damage. At 
worst, domesticated animals, because 
they are not part of the natural com­
munity, are simply an irrelevancy 
from the standpoint of an environmen­
tal ethic. Sheep, for example, do not 
generally graze in natural wilderness 
areas, but in pasture land that has 
al ready been itself domesticated. 
Thei r effect on natu ral ecological 
cycles is minimal. 21 At best, using a 
two-pri nciple envi ronmenta I eth ic, 
humans are able to judge the pain and 
suffering and moral worth of individ­
ual domesticated animals as morally 
significant; as long as questions of 
environmental health or well-being are 
not involved, then even domesticated 
animals can be treated as objects of 
moral concern. 
Finally, it is important to realize 
that in practical terms, a more envi­
ronmentally appropriate human social 
policy will gr-eatly benefit animal life. 
Although from the perspective of eco­
logical theory it may be necessa ry to 
sacrifice some animals for the ecologi­
cal well-being of the natural commu­
nity, in actual practice more animals 
are harmed by human actions that 
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proper treatment of domesticated ani­
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doned in a theory of environmental 
eth ics. The fate of domesticated an i­
mals, as such, is not a subject area 
of envi ronmenta I eth ics. Of cou rse if 
domesticated animals begin to intrude 
upon and ha rm a natu ral ecological 
community, then they would be 
treated like any other human artifact 
(machines, chemicals, etc.) that 
harmed the environment. Or if a 
human began to kill wild natural ani­
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domesticated sheep he would be vio­-
lating an environmental ethic, just as 
if he polluted a stream to "protect" 
his recreational pleasure in speed­-
boating. But the vast majority of 
cases involving domesticated ani­-
mals-the morality of factory farming, 
for example--are in a realm of substan­-
tive ethics completely removed fr'om 
the concerns of an environmental 
ethic. The question of the compati­-
bility or incompatibility of an environ­-
mental ethic and an animal liberation 
ethic when dealing with the treatment 
of domesticated animals as such is 
th us unanswerable and misconceived: 
these are simply two different subject 
matters. 
